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ONE-SIDED CONTRACTS IN
COMPETITIVE CONSUMER MARKETS
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner∗
Abstract
This paper shows that one-sided terms in standard contracts, which deny consumers a contractual benefit that seems
efficient on average, may arise in competitive markets without
informational problems (other than those of courts). A onesided term might be an efficient response to situations in which
courts cannot perfectly observe all the contingencies needed for
an accurate implementation of a balanced contractual term
when firms are more concerned about their reputation, and
thus less inclined to behave opportunistically, than consumers
are. We develop this explanation, discuss its positive and normative implications, and compare them to those of informationbased explanations for one-sided terms.
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The usual assumption in economic analysis of law is that in
a competitive market without informational asymmetries the
terms of the contracts between sellers and buyers will be optimal in the sense that any deviation would impose greater expected costs on the seller than on the buyer, or on the buyer
than on the seller. But could there be cases in which onesided contracts contracts containing a term or terms that
imposes a greater expected cost on one side than benefit on the
other would be found in such markets even in the absence of
fraud, prohibitive information costs, or other market imperfections? That is the possibility that we explore in this paper.
We focus on the following asymmetry between seller and
buyer in cases in which the latter is a consumer rather than
another business or comparable entity: The seller in such a
case may be deterred from behaving opportunistically by considerations of reputation; the consumer is not constrained by
such considerations, because he has no reputation to lose, assuming that his opportunistic behavior in a particular transaction will not become known to the market as a whole. This difference is important whenever it is difficult to specify contractual terms to cover every important contingency that courts
could accurately and easily enforce. In such circumstances, opportunistic buyers might try to use balanced terms to press
for benefits and advantages beyond those that the terms were
actually intended to provide.
Slanting the terms of the contract in favor of the seller is,
we show, a way of redressing the balance. The existence of a
one-sided contract does not imply that the transaction will be
one-sided, but only that the seller will have discretion with respect to how to treat the consumer. A seller concerned about its
reputation can be expected to treat consumers better than required by the letter of the contract. But the seller s right to
stand on the contract as written will protect it against opportunistic buyers. A one-sided contract may thus be preferred by
informed parties ex ante as a cheaper mechanism for inducing
efficient outcomes, should contingencies arise during the performance of the contract, than a more balanced contract that
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because of imperfect enforcement could create costs as a consequence of consumers enforcing protective provisions in the contract.
When firms are influenced by reputational considerations,
contracts that appear on paper to be one-sided against the consumer may in reality be implemented in a balanced way. The
distinction between contracts on paper and their actual implementation is one that has received much attention from the literature on relational contracts between businesses.1 As our
analysis highlights, however, the distinction is also relevant to
contracts that businesses enter into with consumers who are
not repeat players. As long as the business is a repeat player
with the consumer side of the market, its expectation of doing
business with other consumers in the future may dissuade it
from enforcing a one sided-contract to the hilt even though the
business does not expect to have further dealings with this consumer.

1

See, for example, Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:
A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963); Charles Goetz & Robert Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981); Lisa Bernstein,
Merchant Law in Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code s Search for Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765 (1996). The paper in this literature
closest to our analysis in its emphasize on problems of observability by courts
is Benjamin Klein s analysis of franchise agreement. See Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost determinants of Unfair Contractual Arrangements, 70 Am. Econ.
Rev. 356 (1980).
In his contribution to this symposium, Jason Johnston seeks, like us, to
analyze the distinction between the language and the actual implementation of
contracts in the context of contracts between businesses and consumers. See
Jason Johnston, The Return of Bargain: an Economic Theory of Standard Form
Contracts and the Negotiation of Business Relationships, Working Paper, 2005.
The only prior paper of which we know to have explored this issue is Clay Gillette s study of rolling contracts that consumers enter into online. See Clay Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, Wisconsin Law Review 679
(2004).
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I. EXPLAINING ONE-SIDED CONTRACTS
We consider a market that is competitive and in which sellers offer boilerplate contracts that include provisions which
contain onerous terms that appear to impose on buyers expected costs that exceed the benefits to the seller. Examples
are pre-dispute mandatory arbitration clauses, holder in due
course clauses, forum clauses in cruise-ship ticket contracts,
and shrink-wrap licenses.
Contracts that contain such terms and, as is typical of such
contracts, are offered to consumers on a take-it-or-leave-it basis
are described by critics as contracts of adhesion. An older,
and pretty well discredited, scholarly literature thought the
absence of bargaining showed that the seller must have monopoly power, enabling him to foist on consumers whatever
terms he liked. But transaction costs, plus agency costs, relative to the modest stakes in most consumer transactions, are
sufficient explanations for why sellers prefer a form contract to
individual negotiations.2 Nor is it obvious why a monopolist
would offer suboptimal terms, rather than just charging a monopoly price for balanced terms, a price that would be higher
because the consumer was receiving greater value.3
But this leaves unexplained the one-sidedness of many
form contracts. Scholars often try to explain them as a result of
informational problems. Consumers could be inadequately informed about the provisions included in the contracts or their
consequences.4 Consumers understanding could also be distorted by the kind of cognitive problems that are receiving in-

2

See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 115 (6th
ed. 2003).
3 See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard
Form Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements
(New York University School of Law, Aug. 22, 2005, unpublished), and references cited there.
4 See, e.g., Michael I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract:
Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 Georgia Law Review 583,
594 -603 (1990).
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creasing attention from economists.5 Or sellers could be induced to offer one-sided contracts by the presence of adverse
selection, as we explain in Part IV.6 Scholars who advance
these explanations oppose judicial enforcement of contracts of
adhesion, when they contain such terms, in the name of unconscionability or similar doctrines.7 Some courts have
agreed,8 but most have not.9
Must the presence of one-sided contracts in competitive
markets be due to informational problems? Are courts that enforce such contracts failing to intervene when they should? Or
might there be an explanation that does not depend on assuming asymmetric information in favor of sellers, or other possible
sources of market failure? We show that such an explanation
does exist and that, as a result, the normative inferences that
can be drawn from such contracts are far from being clear and
straightforward.
Many one-sided contracts are found in consumer markets
that have the following characteristics: the seller side of the
market consists of repeat players who have a sunk cost in a
reputation for dealing fairly with consumers, in the sense of
not taking advantage of the one-sided terms as long as the con5 See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 Northwestern University Law Review 1373 (2004). See also Paul Bennett Marrow, The Unconscionability of a Liquidated Damages Clause: A Practical Application of Behavioral Decision Theory, 22 Pace Law Review 27 (2001).
6 See, e.g., Eric Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of
Usury Laws, the Unconscionability Doctrine, and Related Limitations on
the Freedom to Contract," 24 Journal of Legal Studies 283 (1995); Phillipe
Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin, Legal restrictions on Private Contracts
Can Enhance Efficiency, 6 Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
381 (1990).
7 See, e.g., Meyerson, note 3 above, at 608 622 (1990).
8 See, e.g., Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996); State ex rel. Dunlap v.
Berger, 211 W. Va. 549, 567 S.E.2d 265 (2002); Pittsfield Weaving Co. v.
Grove Textiles, Inc., 121 N.H. 344, 430 A.2d 638 (1981) (per curiam); Galligan v. Arovitch, 421 Pa. 301, 219 A.2d 463 (1966); Williams v. WalkerThomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
9 1 E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 4.28 (2d ed. 2001). See,
e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 302 F.3d 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Seekings v.
Jimmy GMC, 130 Ariz. 596, 638 P.2d 210 (1981).
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sumer deals fairly with them; the buyer side of the market consists of parties that because they do not have repeat dealings
with particular sellers (the market is competitive, so consumers can switch easily among sellers), and because privacy rules
or other barriers to pooling of information among sellers prevent sellers from comparing notes about the behavior of individual buyers, do not have a sunk cost in reputation and hence
have no incentive to deal fairly with sellers in the sense of honoring the terms of the contract.
In such a situation, the optimal set of contract terms depends not only on the relative costs and benefits associated
with particular terms but also on the relative propensity of the
parties to behave opportunistically, that is, to take advantage
of contractual terms to impose a cost on the other side that will
exceed the benefit to them, although there will be some benefit,
as otherwise they would not want to exploit such opportunities.
In the asymmetric-reputation case, the seller has little or
no incentive to behave opportunistically because if he does he
will suffer a loss of reputation, which is a cost. The buyer, however, is not deterred by concern for reputation. Nor is he dependably deterred by threat of legal action, since, given feasibility limits on drafting contract terms that free from uncertainty, courts cannot always determine when a party is using a
contract term opportunistically.
In this situation, seemingly one-sided terms may not be
one-sided after all. The expected cost of the term to the buyer
must be discounted by the likelihood that reputational considerations will induce the seller to treat the buyers fairly even
when such treatment is not contractually required. This cost
will sometimes be further reduced by sellers disinclination to
sue consumers even when they have an ethically as well as legally solid case. They may still worry that a suit will injure
their reputation for fair dealing (because the term is onesided), or that the cost of the suit will be disproportionate to
the expected benefit. If, therefore, we assume that should a
suit be brought, the court would be able to determine only
whether the litigated contract term is on average efficient, that
is, on average burdens the bound party less than it benefits the
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obligee, a rule of unconscionability that condemned one-sided
terms would systematically favor opportunistic buyers without
protecting fair buyers because the latter are protected by the
sellers investment in reputation.
Consider by way of example the following provision in the
standard contract that Harvard University Press enters into
with authors: [i]f the Author fails to return the corrected
proofs sheets by the date set by the Publisher, the Publisher
may publish the Work without he Author s approval of proof. 10
Clearly, given the importance of accuracy to the author, the
publisher s enforcing this provision to the hilt would impose on
the author an expected cost greater than the benefit to the publisher, especially given that the agreement does not limit the
publisher s discretion in its choice of the date set by the Publisher.
What could explain the inclusion of this provision in an
agreement recently signed by this publisher and one of us and
his co-author? It could not be the publisher s market power.
The publisher was seeking in this case, as in many others, to
compete with other publishers on other aspects of the agreement. Nor could it have been the publisher s expectation that
this provision would not be noticed by the authors. Authors are
in general likely to read carefully the (short) publication agreement. Furthermore, the authors in this case did notice the provision and asked to amend it, but the publisher indicated that
its policy was not to make amendments to this provision.
Notwithstanding the publisher s insistence on retaining the
provision, the publisher s agent dealing with the authors assured them that they do not have to worry about this provision
and other seemingly one-sided provisions included in the
agreement. Although this assurance had no legal significance,
the authors signed the agreement without worrying that the
publisher would abuse the power given to it by the provision.
Indeed, when the authors were a bit late in returning the

10

See agreement between Harvard University Press and Lucian Bebchuk and
Jesse Fried, March 22, 2004 (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
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proofs, the publisher as expected waited for the corrections
rather than enforcing the provision.
Our explanation is that the provision is intended to protect the publisher from circumstances in which the author s delay in returning proofs is egregious. But if the provision were
explicitly limited to those circumstances, enforcement would be
a difficult undertaking for a court because determining egregiousness might well depend on information available to the
parties but not easily and accurately observable by the court.
The one-sided provision obviates this concern, while the publisher s reputational interest protects the authors from the
publisher s taking advantage of the literal meaning of the provision.
In the circumstances we focus on, a one-sided provision
provides the business with discretion whether to provide the
individual with protection in any given circumstances. In contrast, because a balanced provision cannot be written in an unambiguous way, whether protection will be provided in any
given circumstances will be influenced by the court s discretion.
In some circumstances, a strategy of discretionary protection
is superior to a strategy of judicial discretion.
II. A SIMPLE MODEL
Assume a competitive market in which one side (the seller
side, consisting of many sellers) faces stronger reputational
constraints than the other side does (the buying side, assumed
to consist of many individual consumers). The sellers are repeat-playing firms, and consumers have information about
their behavior. As a result, sellers are concerned about their
reputation. Buyers, however, are not concerned about investing
in reputation because they buy infrequently from a given seller
and sellers do not exchange information about consumers.
In some markets, of course, buyers are not indifferent to
their reputation. They may be firms that are repeat players
with powerful incentives to protect their reputation, while the
sellers may be individuals that transact infrequently. An example is the agreements that university presses have with new
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authors. Our analysis applies to such markets as well. It can
explain, for example, why the agreements that those presses
have with their authors include provisions that seem one-sided
against the author even though authors are likely to read the
terms of these agreements and there is competition among the
publishers. For simplicity of exposition, however, we will assume in the model that the sellers side of the market is the one
composed of firms with reputations to protect.
Similarly, not all consumers are well informed about the
behavior of sellers. Indeed, the cost of becoming informed may
exceed the benefit, resulting in rational ignorance of hidden
traps in contracts that competition may not dispel.11 The novelty of the present analysis is that the same contract forms
that are widely assumed to be based on consumer ignorance
can be shown to be consistent with competition under conditions of full information.
When a contract term is on average efficient, then for each
buyer his expected benefit, B, exceeds the seller s expected cost,
C: C < B. But on average implies that the term won t be efficient in all the circumstances to which it literally applies. Assume it will be efficient in state θ, which has a probability p of
occurring, but not in any other state. Assume that the benefit
to the buyer will be B2 > C in state θ but only B1 < C in the
non-θ state, so that the average benefit to the buyer is p(B2) +
(1 p)(B1). Assume further that courts will be unable to observe whether the state of the world in which the contract dispute arises is θ but the parties will, though all that is necessary for our analysis to hold is that the parties have better information about the presence or absence of θ than courts have.
Sellers in our model offer standardized take-it-or-leave-it
contracts to buyers assumed to be identical and refuse to renegotiate when the time for performance arrives. One can think
of the sellers as large firms that do not trust their agents to
negotiate contract changes, or (a point to which we ll return)
that mistrust consumers who try to negotiate over terms.
11

Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation,
83 Texas Law Review 1581, 1585 86 (2005).
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If a seller fails to comply with a contract term, the consumer will be able to obtain from a court an award of expectation damages equal to B. Because the court will not be able to
distinguish perfectly between consumers who derive a large
benefit from the term and consumers who derive only a small
benefit, there will be a tendency to award damages equal to the
average benefit of the contract term that the seller has violated. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the same
damages are awarded in all cases in this class.
Since B > C, if sellers behavior is not constrained by their
concern for their reputation, the protective term will be included, for without it the seller would have no incentive to confer B and so the value of the contract would not be maximized.
Inclusion of the term produces an efficiency gain of B2 C in
state θ and an efficiency loss of C B1 in the other state, but
the net gain is positive because
p(B2

C) + (1 p) (C

B1) = B

C > 0.

Sellers in a competitive market will offer the term because
while they will be charging a price for the contract that is
higher by C (since that is the cost to the seller of the term), the
expected benefit to consumers will be greater and so consumers
will shun sellers who fail to offer it.
This is the standard result when courts cannot observe the
exact circumstances of a given case and there is no contract renegotiation; a term will be included if the average benefit exceeds the average cost. But it is no longer the case when reputational considerations are in play. For then, provided sellers
practices are known to consumers, sellers will offer only a contract that omits the term benefiting the buyer but they will
have a policy of honoring the (nonexistent) term whenever the
parties are in state θ.
For example, the term might be that the buyer can return
the good and get his money back, and θ might be the state in
which the buyer returns it promptly without having used or
damaged it. Sellers will charge a price that is higher by pC because they expect to incur a cost C with probability p, in cases

9

One-Sided Contracts

10

in θ. But buyers will have an expected benefit of pB2 and thus a
net expected gain of p(B2 C). When some sellers offer such
contracts while following the policy just described, no seller
who fails to provide such a combination will be able to attract
any consumers without losing money.
It might seem that since buyers value the policy, sellers
would make it a term of the contract even if they were constrained to follow the policy by their investment in reputation.
But this is incorrect, because as a contract term the policy
would require adherence by the seller even when it was inefficient to provide the benefit, that is, even when the parties were
in the non-θ state. Thus, if the contract provided that the buyer
could return the good if dissatisfied with it, the seller would be
obligated to accept the return even if the buyer, rather than
actually being dissatisfied with it, had used it as much as he
wanted to or had damaged it so that it was no longer valuable
to him. Of course, the seller might include some qualifying language such as reasonably dissatisfied, but the uncertainty
created by such language would give the buyer some probability of being able to get away with returning the good in circumstances not intended to be covered by the clause.
III. POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Our analysis has both positive and normative implications.
On the positive side, it can explain the large number of cases in
which sellers dependably treat consumers much better than
their contracts require them to do. We have illustrated with a
contract that does not require the seller to accept any returns,
but the seller does so anyway. Similarly, hotels usually do not
charge a guest for checking out of his room shortly after the
check-out time; publishers commonly do not send a manuscript
to the printer without waiting for the author s corrections when
the author is late, and usually overlook other small breaches as
well; airlines sometimes give people double mileage credit if a
flight is delayed; restaurants allow substitutions though the
menu states no substitutions. Such concessions are not properly regarded as advertising or price discrimination, because
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consumers expect them and often would be indignant if they
were withheld.
But because they are not legal entitlements, the seller is
not at the mercy of a buyer who would abuse them but not be
amenable to legal sanctions. Suppose, for example, that instead
of fixing a rigid check-out time, the contract between a hotel
and its guests provided that the guest must leave at the checkout time (or pay for another day) unless he has good cause to
delay his departure for a reasonable amount of time. Such a
provision could be (ab)used by a guest who decides cavalierly to
stay in the room, watching TV, until the evening news. With
the rigid check-out rule, the hotel will be able to charge this
overstaying customer for another day while waiving such
charges routinely for customers who miss the check-out time in
good faith and for good reason.
In the circumstances that we study in this paper, courts
would do well to take a hard line in enforcing the terms of onesided consumer contracts in the absence of evidence of fraud.
Suppose the contract that a seller has with its customers does
not promise them some protection X (say, forgiving charging
for an entire day in the event of a short delay in checking out
due to circumstances beyond a customer s control), but there is
evidence that the seller does commonly accord them X. Should
a court view the common practice as an implicit promise to do
so? Our answer is no, because this would sacrifice the benefits
of an unenforceable policy that allows the firm discretion to
withhold a normally expected benefit.
There will be borderline cases because courts frequently
use evidence of past practice or custom to interpret a contract.
However, this is done mainly in cases in which a contractual
term is ambiguous.12 If the term is crystal clear, as the drafters
of one-sided contracts will endeavor to make it, courts will generally enforce the term as written.

12

Arthur L. Corbin et al., Corbin on Contracts §§ 24,7, 24.9 (Joseph M. Perillo ed. 2005).
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IV. ALTERNATIVE INFORMATION-BASED EXPLANATIONS
We enlarge briefly here on the alternative explanations
mentioned earlier for one-sided contracts. These explanations
are based on informational asymmetries between sellers and
buyers. One explanation assumes that consumers are at an informational disadvantage. They are uninformed about the costs
that the contract may impose upon them or suffer from cognitive limitations and biases when assessing these costs.
The other explanation assumes that there are two types of
consumer, between which the seller cannot distinguish; in
other words, consumers have the information advantage. One
type, who would value a protective provision more than the
other, also happens to be the one that is costlier to serve. In
these circumstances, even if the protective provision is efficient
for all consumers, in equilibrium no consumer might ask for it
out of fear that doing so would make the seller suspect that the
buyer was of the type that is costlier to serve.
Our explanation for one-sided contracts has two different
implications, one positive and one normative, from those of the
alternative, information-based explanations.13 The distinctive
positive implication is that when our explanation is applicable,
firms will not take advantage of the one-sided contracts: only
exceptionally will they stand by the letter of the contract. In
contrast, when one of the two information-based explanations
applies, firms will always (or at least almost always) stick to
the letter of the contract.
The normative implication is that when our explanation is
applicable, the law should not intervene and provide protection
not supplied by the contract, while if the seller has and is exploiting an informational advantage there is an argument for
implying protective provisions in the contract to make it less
one-sided. Similarly, in the presence of inefficient pooling produced by adverse selection, imposing protective provisions
13

There is a sense in which our explanation is information-based too; but
the information deficit in our analysis not a deficit of either party to the
contract, but of the court that may be called upon to enforce the contract.
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could sometimes (though not always) improve matters. The
challenge for future research is to try to distinguish between
the domains of our explanation and the information-based explanations.
We emphasize finally that our analysis is limited to the
case of repetitive selling of consumer products under conditions
of good consumer information about sellers. With infrequent
sales or poor information about sellers, sellers will not be constrained by reputational concerns. Our analysis is likewise inapplicable when the buying side consists not of individual consumers but of firms that have their own reputational stake in
fair dealing, so that sellers have less concern about being take
advantage of by buyers who are not reputation-constrained. It
is the asymmetry of reputation concerns in the case of the repeat seller selling to a consumer that drives our analysis. The
potential existence of such asymmetries is a factor to which
scholars and judges should, we contend, pay close attention.
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